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0. Abstract 
While life satisfaction theories (LSTs) of well-being are barely discussed in philosophy, they are 
popular among social scientists and wider society. When philosophers have discussed LSTs, they 
are taken to be a distinct alternative to the three canonical accounts of well-being—hedonism, 
desire theories, the objective list. This essay makes three main claims. First, on closer inspection, 
LSTs are indistinguishable from a type of desire theory—the global desire theory. Second, the life 
satisfaction/global desire theories are the only subjectivist accounts of well-being in the sense that 
they maintain individuals decide what makes their lives go well for them; hedonism and other 
desire theories are subjectivist only in some alternative senses. Third, subjectivism is implausible, 
although for different reasons from those that are usually given. I examine what I take to be the 
two main current objections to LSTs and argue that they are unproblematic. I then raise two 
different, challenging objections. The first is novel. The second has been noted in passing, but its 
seriousness underestimated. I close by sketching some non-obvious difficulties that subjectivists 
will face if they attempt to show rival objectivist theories suffer even more counterintuitive 
implications. Although subjectivism has a strong intuitive pull, we should be ready to abandon it 
in favour of an objectivist theory—although it is not my purpose here to say which one. 
1. Introduction 
What is it that constitutes well-being: that which is ultimately good for us, or makes our lives go 
well? Philosophers, following Derek Parfit’s influential classification, tend to hold that there are 
only three plausible accounts of well-being, each of which admits of a number of varieties: hedonism, 
desire theories, and objective list theories.3 On the first, well-being consists in happiness, a positive 
balance of pleasant over unpleasant experiences.4 On the second, well-being consists in having 
 
1 I would like to thank Caspar Kaiser, Joel McGuire, Patrick Kaczmarek, Roger Crisp and Tatjana Višak for their 
comments. I am grateful the audience of a seminar the Wellbeing Research Centre, Oxford. This research was made 
possible by funding from the Wellbeing Research Centre, Oxford and the Happier Lives Institute 
2 Wellbeing Research Centre, University of Oxford; Happier Lives Institute 
3  Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (OUP Oxford, 1984) Appendix I.  
4  Here I’m using happiness, the psychological state, in a classically Benthamite way. See J Bentham, An Introduction to 
the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789. I note there is some disagreement among philosophers over which 
psychological state the word ‘happiness’ refers to. For instance Daniel M. Haybron, ‘Mental State Approaches to 
Well-Being’, in The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy, ed. by Matthew D. Adler and Marc Fleurbaey 
(Oxford University Press, 2016) holds happiness is, roughly, a propensity for positive emotions; Leonard Wayne 
Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (Clarendon Press, 1996) understand it as life satisfaction; Fred Feldman, What 
Is This Thing Called Happiness? (Oxford University Press, 2010) takes it to be ‘pro-attitudes’. Such disagreements can 
be confusing as they are sometimes just over the correct usage of the word ‘happiness’ in ordinary language and 
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one’s desires or preferences met. On the third, well-being consists in several goods, which may 
include pleasure and met preferences but will also consist in other ‘objective’ items, such as 
knowledge, love, and friendship. 
While they have not attracted as much attention, philosophers have also written about life satisfaction 
theories of well-being, which are taken to be a distinct, fourth alternative to the ‘canonical’ three 
views just mentioned. On life satisfaction theories (LSTs), well-being consists in life satisfaction, a 
judgement of how one’s life is going overall.5 
That LSTs have not received more interest from philosophers is, perhaps, surprising.  
First, there seems to be clear conceptual space for the view. Very plausibly, mental states play an 
important role in well-being. We can divide mental states into (at least) three natural kinds: 
affective/hedonic (involving pleasurable sensations), conative (involving desire), and cognitive 
(involving reasoning). However, while affective and conative mental states are at the core of two 
of the canonical three theories of well-being—hedonism and desire theories, respectively—there 
is not, on the face of it, a corresponding theory of well-being where cognitive states are central. 
Life satisfaction theories, which require a cognitive judgement of how well one’s life is going, 
would seem to neatly fill that gap. 
Second, the view that well-being consists in life satisfaction is popular in the social sciences and 
society more generally.6 This can be seen in the explosion of research in the last few decades in 
economics and psychology using measures of subjective well-being: individuals’ ratings of the quality 
of their lives.7 Subjective well-being is usually taken to have three measurable components, which 
often go by more than one name: the affective/experiential/hedonic component, the 
evaluative/cognitive component, and the eudaimonic/purpose component.8 Subjective well-being 
(‘SWB’) is standardly used as an umbrella term to refer to any or all of the components.  
The most commonly used measure of SWB is life satisfaction, an evaluation. Life satisfaction is 
usually measured by asking individuals “Overall, how satisfied are you with your life, nowadays?” 
on a score of 0 (“not at all satisfied”) to 10 (“completely satisfied”). SWB researchers often 
(unhelpfully) refer to life satisfaction as a measure of ‘happiness’, even though someone’s 
‘happiness’ in ordinary use refers to their affective states—the ones hedonists contend ultimately 
 
sometimes over what well-being is (where ‘happiness’ and ‘well-being’ are used as synonyms). For instance, Sumner 
rejects hedonism (as defined above), in favour of a life satisfaction theory (as defined in the next paragraph above) 
but nevertheless uses the word ‘happiness’ to refer to life satisfaction.  
5  For philosophers who treat it as distinct, see Haybron, “Mental State Approaches to Well-Being”; Sumner, Welfare, 
Happiness, and Ethics; Feldman, What Is This Thing Called Happiness? Valerie Tiberius, “Well-Being: Psychological 
Research for Philosophers,” Philosophy Compass 1, no. 5 (September 1, 2006): 493–505  explicitly states life 
satisfaction is a theory of well-being omitted from the conception in Parfit, Reasons and Persons. 
6  A point noted by e.g. Tiberius, “Well-Being: Psychological Research for Philosophers”; Haybron, “Mental State 
Approaches to Well-Being.” 
7  Paul Dolan and Mathew P. White, “How Can Measures of Subjective Well-Being Be Used to Inform Public 
Policy?,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 2, no. 1 (March 21, 2007): 71–85; Ed Diener et al., “Subjective Well-Being: 
Three Decades of Progress,” Psychological Bulletin, 1999.  
8 These components often have a specified temporal element, e.g. how happy you feel right now vs how happy you 
have been feeling recently. 
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matter—and LSTs and hedonism are distinct and differently motivated theories, a point we touch 
on later.9  
The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, to do some conceptual housekeeping: to outline what 
LSTs are, what motivates them, and how they relate to the other theories of well-being. That a 
plausible theory of well-being should have received little discussion by philosophers is unsettling.10 
It prompts us to wonder if we really have stumbled across a new theory or we have an old one in 
disguise. Second, to evaluate LSTs. This task is timely given the relative lack of scrutiny that LSTs 
have received so far, combined with the fact that measures of subjective well-being are now, 
arguably, teetering on the verge of becoming a respectable and practical means of determining 
how to allocate resources in private and public policy decisions.11 
This essay makes three main claims. First, on closer inspection, LSTs are extensionally equivalent 
to a type of desire theory—specifically, what Parfit called the global desire theory (GDT)—and may 
be identical to it.12  
Second, the life satisfaction/global desire theory is the only subjectivist account of well-being in the 
sense that it maintains that you decide what makes your life go well. While hedonism and other 
desire theories are sometimes described as ‘subjectivist’, I argue they are objectivist, as I stipulate the 
terms here, in the sense that you do not get to decide what makes your life go well—certain things 
are good or bad for you regardless of your judgements on the matter.13 
Third, subjectivism is implausible, although for different reasons than those usually given. I state 
what seem to be the two main extant issues for LSTs and argue that they are unproblematic. I then 
raise two different, challenging objections. The first is novel. The second has been noted in passing, 
but its seriousness seems to have been overlooked. I then highlight some non-obvious challenges 
subjectivists will face if they attempt to attack the rival objectivist theories for having even more 
counterintuitive implications. Although subjectivism has a strong intuitive pull, we should be ready 
to abandon it in favour of an objectivist theory—although it is not my purpose here to say which 
one. 
Here’s the plan of attack. Section two introduces LSTs and explains their subjectivist justification. 
Section three discusses whether hedonism and desire theories are subjectivist and explores how 
they relate to LSTs. Sections four to six consider objections to subjectivism. Section four examines 
 
9  For instance, see John F. Helliwell, “Three Questions about Happiness,” Behavioural Public Policy, December 20, 
2019, 4. Helliwell is a leading social scientist who uses ‘happiness’ and ‘subjective well-being’ interchangeably, 
defends his (and others) imprecise usage with the following, surprisingly candid, explanation: “While ‘subjective 
wellbeing’ is more precise, it simply does not have the convening power of ‘happiness’”. 
10  Some notable exceptions are mentioned in footnote 3.  
11  See, for instance, the World Happiness Report and Global Happiness Policy Report series, e.g. John F. Helliwell, 
Richard Layard, and Jeffrey Sachs, World Happiness Report 2017 (Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 2017); 
J Helliwell, R Layard, and J Sachs, “World Happiness Report 2019,” 2019.  
12  Parfit, Reasons and Persons.  
13  Roger Crisp (personal correspondence) makes the interesting suggestion that presumably LSTs accept this in 
some form too: your well-being consists in getting what you think to be good, even if you reject that meta-view. 
This doesn’t seem a problematic inconsistency, if it is an inconsistency at all. Suppose someone says, “I don’t think 
my well-being consists in whatever I think it does, I think it consists in happiness”. The subjectivist and hedonist 
will agree what makes life go well for this person—happiness—but disagree about the explanation: for the former, 
their judgement of what matters does the work of make this true; for the latter, it is irrelevant.  
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two supposedly troubling objections I claim are, in fact, unproblematic. Section five presses two 
serious objections—one novel and one underappreciated. Section six considers the challenge that 
subjectivists face in attacking rival objectivist views. 
Before we proceed, two caveats. 
First, we must separate the question of whether LSTs are the correct account of well-being from 
whether it is useful, in practice, to measure individuals’ life satisfaction. Here, I am only concerned 
with the first question. If I am right that LSTs are implausible, what follows is that life satisfaction 
will not be the theoretically ideal measure of well-being; that is, the most accurate way to measure 
changes in well-being, whatever well-being is. I won’t argue for it here, but I am sympathetic to 
hedonism and therefore suspect that hedonic measures of SWB are closer to this ideal. To be clear, 
however, whether or not LSTs are implausible, it does not follow that efforts to measure life 
satisfaction have been or are in vain. Two factors combine to make measuring life satisfaction 
valuable regardless of one’s views of what well-being ultimately is.14 
One is that life satisfaction data are very cheap and easy to collect. Asking “Overall, how satisfied 
are you with your life, nowadays” (0 – 10) generally takes respondents 30 seconds or less to answer 
and is simple to attach to existing surveys.15 By contrast, if researchers want to measure someone’s 
happiness in detail, then much more intrusive methods are required. For instance, the Day 
Reconstruction Method asks participants to break their previous day into episodes, like scenes 
from a movie, and score each episode. It takes around 40 minutes to complete and is therefore 
often impractical.16  
The other factor is that life satisfaction surveys allow individuals to judge how their lives are going 
by their own standards, whatever those standards are. There are two further reasons to think this 
factor matters.  
First, on the grounds that, as a matter of democratic legitimacy or justice, we must respect people’s 
views about what they believe makes their life go best, even if we sincerely believed disrespecting 
their views would be better for them overall.17 
Second, because it means life satisfaction scores will likely contain useful information about well-
being and so may be a suitable proxy measure for it.18 As Haybron notes “philosophical theories 
of well-being tend to agree in broad terms about which lives are better and worse for people, so a 
reliable indicator of well-being on one view might also be serviceable on another”.19  
The second caveat is that this paper argues against LSTs—or, alternatively, against subjectivism—
instead of arguing for an alternative. To make an all-things-considered judgement of which theory 
 
14  Haybron, “Mental State Approaches to Well-Being.” 
15  ONS, “Initial Investigation into Subjective Wellbeing from the Opinions Survey,” 2011.  
16  Daniel Kahneman et al., “A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day Reconstruction 
Method,” Science 306, no. 5702 (2004): 1776–80.  
17  See Daniel M. Haybron and Valerie Tiberius, “Well-Being Policy: What Standard of Well-Being?,” Journal of the 
American Philosophical Association 1, no. 4 (2015): 712–33. 
18 A ‘proxy’ is an indirect measure thought to correlate well with the item of ultimate interest and which can 
therefore be used if the latter is not itself measurable; e.g. economists have long used income as a proxy for well-
being. 
19  Haybron, “Mental State Approaches to Well-Being,” 365.  
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of well-being is correct requires considering the merits and demerits of all the candidates alongside 
one another. If we reject LSTs on the grounds of their subjectivist roots, that still leaves it open 
which of the credible objectivist views is the most plausible. I do not attempt to evaluate those 
alternatives here. This is not just for reasons of space, but also because it is less urgent: while much 
has been said about theories of well-being, standardly-categorised, not much has been said about 
the subjectivist theory in particular. 
2. Life satisfaction theories and subjectivism 
Roger Crisp points out that any adequate theory of well-being has two parts. First, the enumerative: 
which thing (or things) constitutes well-being? Second, the explanatory: what is it about that thing 
(or thing) that makes it good for us?20  
Thus, hedonism, classically understood, combines enumerative hedonism—well-being consists in 
happiness, experiences that are overall enjoyable(/pleasurable)—with explanatory hedonism—it is the 
intrinsic pleasurableness of these experiences that makes them good for us.  
To highlight a contrast, Crisp notes that someone who held that well-being consists in enjoyable 
experiences, but that enjoyable experiences were good because they (say) fulfilled our nature, 
would be an enumerative hedonist but not an explanatory hedonist; they would instead be an 
explanatory perfectionist. 
What are the two parts of LSTs? The enumerative is that well-being consists in a judgement of 
how one’s life is going overall.21 And the explanatory part? In the philosophical literature, the only 
explanation on offer seems to be subjectivism, the view that you get to decide what makes your life 
go well.22 Sumner, perhaps the leading proponent of life satisfaction theories, writes: 
what we are seeking is an adequate subjective theory of welfare, one on which the subject’s 
point of view on her life is authoritative for determining when that life is going well for her. 
(emphasis in original)23 
We might alternatively call subjectivism agent sovereignty, the view Arneson defines as “that what is 
good for each person is entirely determined by that very person’s evaluative perspective”.24 In 
 
20  Roger Crisp, “Hedonism Reconsidered,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73, no. 3 (2006): 619–45. 
21  Feldman points out there are many dimensions on which what he calls “whole life satisfaction” theories of 
happiness can vary. These are largely irrelevant to the plausibility of the view, with the exception of one dimension 
(‘actualism’ vs ‘hypotheticalism’), which is mentioned in section 5.2, so I do not discuss them here. Fred Feldman, 
“Whole Life Satisfaction Concepts of Happiness,” Theoria 74, no. 3 (September 20, 2008): 219–38.  
22 This is the explanation given by Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics; Haybron, “Mental State Approaches to 
Well-Being”; Tiberius, “Well-Being: Psychological Research for Philosophers.” Roger Crisp (personal 
correspondence) suggests it might be hard to elucidate the philosophy theory behind the psychological research in 
life satisfaction on the grounds that it might be too indeterminate—SWB researchers may not generally have a single 
theoretical justification in mind when they opt for measures of life satisfaction. I do not share this concern: we are 
considering what the most plausible theoretical justification would be, and what follows from it, and there only 
seems to be only one plausible justification available.  
23  Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics: 160. See also Jennifer S. Hawkins, “The Subjective Intuition,” Philosophical 
Studies 148 (2010): 61–68. 
24 Richard J. Arneson, “Human Flourishing Versus Desire Satisfaction,” Social Philosophy and Policy 16, no. 1 (1999): 




contrast, as I term it, objectivism is the position you do not get to decide what makes your life go 
well—certain things are intrinsically good or bad for you regardless of your judgements on the 
matter.25 In the next section, I make a couple of comments on various ways ‘subjective’, ‘objective’ 
and their cognates have been used in the literature. 
How does subjectivism get us to the view well-being consists in life satisfaction? If individuals are 
the authorities on what makes their lives go well, how well an individual’s life goes is simply a 
matter of how well they judge it to be going. Hence, well-being consists in life satisfaction: the 
individual’s judgement of how well their life is going overall (by the lights of their own reasons, 
whatever those are). 
In the social science literature, a variety of reasons are given for the choice of life satisfaction as 
the theoretically preferred measure of well-being. As my aim here is not interdisciplinary exegesis, 
it should suffice to say these reasons generally fall into three categories. First, those that are in the 
spirit of subjectivism, even if different terminology is used.26 Second, considerations that are 
plausibly important for settling on a measure of well-being, but leave it open which particular one 
should be used; for instance, we might agree that the measure must be “comprehensive—it refers 
to the whole of a person’s life” and that “it should have validity [i.e. succeeding in measuring what 
it is supposed to measure] and its causes should be widely studied”.27 Third, that life satisfaction is 
to be preferred because it is a hedonic measure—a measure of pleasure and displeasure.28 To be 
clear, this third reason is confused: if hedonic states are what ultimately matters then, assuming 
what are usually described as ‘hedonic measures’ of SWB succeed in measuring hedonic states, 
then they would be the measure closest to being theoretically ideal.29 
As such, we do not find, in the social sciences, a justification for life satisfaction theories besides 
subjectivism. I point this out because the objections I raise later ultimately result from the 
explanatory component of LSTs, i.e. subjectivism; thus, if we had some alternative, non-
subjectivist explanation of why well-being consists in life satisfaction, these objections would miss 
their mark. 
Why be a subjectivist? The view has a straightforward intuitive appeal and it seems unnecessary to 
motivate it at any length. After all, well-being refers to what makes someone’s life go well for them. 
Hence it seems odd, grating even, to think that something can make someone better off if they—
 
25 Of course, our judgements of what is intrinsically good/bad for us may instrumentally good/bad for us. See 
further discussion in section 5.1. 
26  E.g.  Andrew E. Clark et al., The Origins of Happiness : The Science of Well-Being over the Life Course, 2018: 4 argue that 
life satisfaction is “democratic—it allows individuals to assess their lives on the basis of what they consider important 
to themselves”; John F Helliwell, H Huang, and S Wang, “The Geography of World Happiness,” in World Happiness 
Report 2015 (Sustainable Development Research Network, 2015): 19 give four reasons, the first being that “we attach 
fundamental importance to the evaluations that people make of their own lives”. 
27 Quotations from Clark et al., The Origins of Happiness : The Science of Well-Being over the Life Course, 4. 
28 E.g. Dolan and White, “How Can Measures of Subjective Well-Being Be Used to Inform Public Policy?”: claim 
the importance of both life satisfaction and affective measures of SWB (and not just the latter) is “generally 
grounded in hedonistic philosophies”.  
29 This confusion may be a product of the fact that life satisfaction is often called a ‘measure of happiness’.  
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the welfare subject whom we hope to benefit—do not think it makes their life go better.30 As 
Railton writes: 
It would be an intolerably alienated conception of someone’s good to imagine that it might 
fail in any way to engage him.31 
Here are two supporting cases. Consider the Struggling Artist, a person who judges that their life 
goes better if they keep living as a painter, rather than give up and become an accountant, even 
though their poverty and continued rejection makes their artistic life miserable.32 Living as the 
artist, they suppose, they get to live their life in a way that they think is best for them. There is 
something disconcerting about insisting their life would go better for them as the accountant when 
they emphatically judge that it would be worse for them.33 
Consider also the Reformed Hedonist: in their dotage, someone reflects on their hard-partying student 
days. They accept that they were happy and having their desires met then, and that this indulgent 
stint didn’t have any adverse effects on their later life. What’s more, at that time, they were very 
satisfied with their life. Now that they are older and (so they suppose) wiser, they have taken a 
somewhat puritanical turn. As a result, they conclude that their life was going badly for them during 
their carousing youth and that, at the time, they were seriously mistaken about what made their 
life go well. A potential attraction of subjectivism is that it allows the individual to later revise how 
their life has gone.34  
These should suffice to show subjectivism’s appeal.  
3. Satisfaction, subjectivism, and distinguishing theories of well-being 
I’ve just argued that the justification for LSTs is subjectivism. This may raise eyebrows. While we 
would expect that the objective list, as its name indicates, is an objectivist theory, shouldn’t 
hedonism and desire theories also be subjectivist? In this section, I argue that hedonism and all 
but one version of the desire theory are objectivist. I then argue that the version of the desire 
theory that is subjectivist—the global desire theory—seems to be identical to the life satisfaction 
theory and comment on how this seems not to have been noticed. Objective list theories are not 
discussed here. 
We should clarify a few terms. I am using the word ‘subjectivism’ in a specific way, namely, to 
refer to the view that you decide what makes your life go well. Other authors have taken a 
‘subjectivist’ theory of well-being to be one on which, roughly speaking, an individual’s “pro-
 
30 If readers do not feel the pull of subjectivism, that only makes the objective of the essay—which is to argue that 
life satisfactionism is implausible—easier to achieve. 
31  Peter Railton, “Facts and Values,” Philosophical Topics (University of Arkansas Press, 1986): 9 
32  Case adapted from Haybron, “Mental State Approaches to Well-Being.” 
33  This reaction may be partially explained by norms of politeness and/or epistemic deference: even if I think you’re 
wrong, I should (generally) refrain from telling you so, not least because I expect you to know more about your own 
life.  
34  This raises a challenge of which temporal vantage point(/s) LSTs privilege. See footnote 36. 
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attitudes”, such as a liking, wanting, preferring, and endorsing, play some important role (to be 
further specified) role in what makes their life go well.35 For contrast, call this pro-attitudism.36 
Clearly, both subjectivism and pro-attitudism are subjective theories in the ordinary language sense 
of the word ‘subjective’, that is, based on personal feelings, tastes, and opinion (rather than facts).  
This ordinary language use of ‘subjective’ can also be distinguished from particular philosophical 
uses of the term where ‘subjective’ might refer to (as I define them) subjectivism, pro-attitudist, 
or, to add to the confusion, a mental state account of well-being—one where well-being consists 
entirely in mental states (as opposed to mind-independent facts).37 The differences between these 
terms will be illustrated shortly. 
Hedonism, desire theories, and life satisfaction theories are all clearly subjective in the ordinary 
sense of the word and in the pro-attitudist sense. They can also come in mental state variants—
more on this later. 
Why then, is hedonism not a subjectivist theory? As Haybron notes, the hedonist denies that what 
makes your life go well is up to you—to the hedonist, happiness makes your life go well whatever 
your views on the importance of happiness.38 This was the point of Struggling Artist: the hedonist 
holds it would be better for the person to become an accountant because that would make them 
happier. LSTs deny that this would make the person’s life go better even though they would be 
happier, as this person would not judge their life as going better overall, despite their greater 
happiness.39 
Why aren’t all desire theories subjectivist? After all, aren’t my desires, well, mine? The issue here 
is with unwanted desires. Some desire theories will count it as good for you to have your desires 
met even if you deny that fulfilling those desires would make your life go better. Parfit illustrates 
this with his famous case of Addiction:  
I shall inject you with an addictive drug. From now on, you will wake each morning with 
an extremely strong desire to have another injection of this drug. Having this desire will 
 
35  Chris Heathwood, “Desire-Fulfillment Theory,” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being, ed. Guy 
Fletcher (Routledge, 2015), 151–63 uses ‘subjectivist’ loosely in this sense, i.e. where pro-attitudes play an important 
role.  
36  Pro-attitude objectivism would be the view where, roughly, pro-attitudes play no important role in making life go 
well.  
37  E.g. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics uses ‘subjective’ where I use ‘subjectivism’; David Owen Brink, Moral 
Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1989) uses 
‘subjective’ roughly to mean a mental state theory.  
38  Haybron, “Mental State Approaches to Well-Being.”  
39  Roger Crisp (personal correspondence) raises the issue of which temporal perspectives are relevant for LSTs. 
Suppose the starving artist did become an accountant after all and, from their new temporal vantage point, thought 
their new life was better. Would LSTs hold their life had improved (as judged from the later vantage point) or 
worsened (as judged by the earlier one)? As Feldman (2008) notes, there are a number of choices one must make in 
constructing a fully specific LSTs, and temporal perspective is a one such choice point, although not one he 
mentions. One could opt for additive LSTs, where lifetime well-being is the total of one’s level of life satisfaction at 
each moment. The alternative would be privileged-perspective LSTs, where certain temporal vantage points are more or 
less important for determining lifetime well-being. The obvious privileged-perspective is to give more/total weight 
to how one does (or would) evaluate life from one’s death bed. While there are theoretical interesting issues here, 
they are unimportant for our purposes, as the criticisms I later make of the view apply to any precisification of it. 
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be in itself neither pleasant nor painful, but if the desire is not fulfilled within an hour it 
will then become very painful. This is no cause for concern, since I shall give you ample 
supplies of this drug. Every morning, you will be able at once to fulfil this desire. The 
injection, and its after‐effects, would also be neither pleasant nor painful. You will spend 
the rest of your days as you do now.40 
Parfit points out that on a summative desire theory—on which all your desires count and how your 
life goes overall is the product of the extent to which each desire is fulfilled and intensity of each 
desire—your life goes better in Addiction.41 But it is hard to believe one’s life would go better in the 
Addiction case. 
Parfit draws a distinction between local and global desires where a desire is “global if it is about some 
part of one's life considered as a whole, or is about one's whole life”. A global desire theory (GDT), 
counts only global desires. On this theory, we can say being addicted is worse for us; when we 
think about how our lives go overall, we do not want to become addicted. 
In discussions of desires, a familiar distinction is “between what a person “truly desires” or finds 
truly appealing, and what a person wants in the thinner, merely behavioral sense that he is simply 
disposed to try to get.”42 The ‘true’ desires are those we not only want, but we want to want. 
Determining which are our true desires for ourselves seems to unavoidably require an all-things-
considered cognitive evaluation with respect to our well-being: we start out by wanting P, and if 
we realise we also want not-P, and then we have to decide whether we want P or not-P by assessing 
which desire makes our life go better.  
We are now able to make several observations.  
First, we can understand local desires as the behavioural wantings and the global desires as the 
‘true’ desires.  
Second, there is an important sense in which we choose what our global desires are—through this 
reflective, cognitive weighing process—while we do not choose our local desires—they are simply 
our involutionary passions. If we choose any of our desires, we choose the global ones.  
Third, a local desire theory, where only local desire counts would, in fact, be objectivist—it will 
claim that I am better off in Addiction even if I strenuously protest that it's my life and I don’t think 
that I’m better off. 
On the other hand, it doesn’t seem possible to understand the GDT as objectivist. It holds the 
only desires that matter for well-being are the global desires. But, as noted, I get to choose what 
my global desires are. Hence, on GDT, I get to decide what makes my life go well. Subjectivism 
just is the view that I get to decide what makes my life go well. Thus, GDT is subjectivist. 
Fifth, the summative desire theory is then a subjectivist-objectivist hybrid because it holds that 
both local and global desires matter.  
 
40  Parfit, Reasons and Persons: Appendix I. 
41  Ibid 
42  Heathwood, “Desire-Fulfillment Theory” 142. 
10 
 
At this point, it is becoming hard to see what difference, if any, there is between LSTs and GDT. 
How satisfied one is with one’s life overall is presumably just some aggregate of the extent to 
which all of one’s global desires are satisfied. As a toy example, suppose the only two desires I 
have about my life as a whole are to have run a marathon and fallen in love and, further, I think 
both desires are equally as important. How satisfied I am with my life overall is the averaged extent 
to which I have satisfied those two desires. As such, I propose LSTs and GDT are the same view 
that have gone by different names. 
While this result is perhaps surprising, it seems less so when we consider that it would be odd for 
there to be more than one subjectivist theory. After all, subjectivists agree that well-being consists 
in the same type of good for everyone: namely, whatever each individual decides their well-being 
consists in. Given LSTs and GDT are subjectivist, that means they agree on what well-being is. In 
Crisp’s terminology, they have the same explanatory and enumerative parts. In contrast, we can 
have as many conceptually distinguishable objectivist theories as we want: we just need to specify 
which good or goods make life go well, whatever those in possession of such goods think of the 
matter. 
The natural concern here is that this proposal is in error. After all, philosophers who have discussed 
LSTs take them to be an alternative to desire theories, of which the global desire theory is a type. 
What might the distinction be? 
Haybron supposes the distinction is that LSTs are mental state theories whilst desire theories are 
non-mental state theories: life satisfaction is a state of mind, and desire satisfaction is a state of the 
world.43 To illustrate the difference between mental and non-mental state theories, suppose you 
want there to be cheese on the moon. If someone put cheese on the moon but didn’t tell you, your 
desire would be satisfied—the world would go the way you wanted it to—but you would not be 
more satisfied. As Haybron puts it: “Crudely, we might say that [desire] satisfaction involves 
actually getting what you want, while life satisfaction involves thinking you’re getting what you 
want.”44 
This is, in fact, too crude: both desire and life satisfaction theories admit of mental state and non-
mental state flavours. For instance, Chris Heathwood has argued that the most plausible version 
of the desire satisfaction theory is subjective desire satisfaction, where well-being consists in believing 
one is getting what one wants—this is a mental state theory.45 Sumner, on the other hand, opts for 
a non-mental state life satisfaction theory; he insists there is an information constraint on well-
being: someone who is satisfied with life only because they are incorrectly informed is not doing 
well.46 We return to Sumner’s theory in a further section.  
Sumner opts for LSTs, having previously argued against desire theories, from which it follows that 
he takes them to be distinct. However, it’s not clear what he takes the distinction to be. Sumner 
makes no mention of a global desire theory, so perhaps he never seriously considered that type of 
 
43  Haybron, “Mental State Approaches to Well-Being.” 
44  Ibid: 365 
45 Chris Heathwood, “Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism,” Philosophical Studies 128, no. 3 (April 2006): 539–63. 
46  Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics: ch. 6. Someone might insist that LSTs and GDT are both subjectivist, but 
one is the mental state and the other the non-mental version. This seems an overly contrived distinction, not least 
because it’s unclear which one would be which anyway. 
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desire theory.47 Valerie Tiberius not only argues that life satisfaction is distinct from Parfit’s 
standard three theories, but even states "there is no direct counterpart of preference or desire 
theories in the psychology literature”, a literature which includes life satisfaction.48 She does not 
offer a distinction between life satisfaction and the other theories of well-being either. 
As a final throw of the dice, someone could suggest that the distinction is that the two views take 
different mental states as central: cognitive ones for LSTs, conative ones for GDT.49 
However, we’ve already noted that working out what one’s global desires are is an unavoidably 
cognitive task: we start with the local desires and reflect on which of those are our true desires. 
Hence, our global desires are some sort of hybrid cognitive-conative mental state, which elides the 
proposed distinction. Recall that life satisfaction seems just to be an aggregate of our global desires, 
rather than a different type of mental state to them.  
That life satisfaction and global desire theories turn out to be the same account of well-being is, I 
aver, a pleasant surprise. It was puzzling that, in general, philosophers thought there were only 
three plausible accounts of well-being while social scientists and some philosophers had quietly 
landed on a credible, fourth view. We now see this was a case of mistaken identity. Along the way, 
we realised that we can have subjectivist and objectivist (and hybrid) desire theories. From here on 
in, as life satisfaction and global desire theories seem to be one and the same, and the only 
subjectivist view, we can use the terms interchangeably.   
For the interested reader still concerned the two views are different, I invite them to consider, as 
a further test, whether any of the objections we discuss later only apply to one of (the descriptions 
of) the views.  
4. Subjectivism and its discontents 
With our conceptual house in order, the next task is to evaluate the subjectivist view. In the next 
section, I discuss two challenging objections to subjectivism. Before we get there, this section notes 
the main extant objections raised to the view usually described as LSTs and (briefly) argues they 
are unproblematic. I do this because, if we already had decisive reason to reject the view, it would 
be unnecessary to identify further reasons to do so.  
According to Dan Haybron, in the current literature, the two main problems for life satisfaction 
theories are as follows. First, evaluating one’s life involves a global judgement of how well one’s 
life measures up to one’s standards. Yet:  
it is doubtful that most individuals have well-defined notions of what matters to them and 
how to add it all up in a single judgment: life is full of apples and oranges, and it is likely 
to be substantially arbitrary, even from the agent’s own perspective, how to add up all the 
good and bad things in her life. […] [T]here’s no reason to expect people to know how to 
make such a judgment. As a result, any judgment about the overall quality of one’s life is 
bound to be substantially arbitrary.50 
 
47 One would expect to find it in Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics: ch. 5 which is on desire theories. 
48  Tiberius, “Well-Being: Psychological Research for Philosophers”: 495. 
49  I am grateful to Matthew Jernberg for this suggestion. 
50  Haybron, “Mental State Approaches to Well-Being,” 366. 
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Specifically, then, the concern here is that it’s unclear which principled procedure individuals 
should use to judge their lives. However, if we accept subjectivism, this concern is moot: because 
individuals are the authorities on how their lives are going, they can evaluate their lives however 
they want—that’s the point. This objection fails to account for the motivation for the view. 
Haybron claims the second major issue is that: 
life satisfaction embodies a judgment, not about how well one’s life is going, but about 
whether one’s life is good enough: is it satisfactory? It is doubtful that most people have 
very clear ideas about how good their lives must be to count as satisfactory, or that anyone 
should care very much if they did. In short, life satisfaction is a gauge, not of the goodness 
of a life, but of the good-enoughness of a life. A person might reasonably be satisfied with what 
even he regards as a life that’s going badly—things could be worse, he might think, so why 
complain? (emphasis in original)51 
This objection relies heavily on the ordinary meaning of the word ‘satisfied’ as referring to reaching 
a sub-maximal level of some property. The usage here is analogous to the difference between 
satisficing and maximising consequentialism: according to the former, we are required to bring about 
some level of good but doing more good than that is supererogatory; according to the latter, we 
are required to do the most good. However, understanding ‘satisfied’ as being about ‘good-
enoughness’ in this way is inessential to LSTs. We can simply say, as we did earlier, that on LSTs 
well-being consists in judging how your life is going overall rather than—as the objection requires—
whether it is good enough. 
If these were the most serious issues for LSTs, we should think the view in pretty good shape. 
5. Subjectivism’s surprises 
The next two subsections each raise a very serious problem for subjectivism. 
5.1  Automaximisation 
Suppose you want your life to go maximally well—you want your well-being to be as high as 
possible. On subjectivism, individuals are the authorities on how their lives are going. Therefore, 
if you decide that your life is going maximally well then, hey presto, it is.  
Call this the automaximisation objection. I take it to be a straightforward reductio against subjectivism. 
It seems wholly implausible that the mere fact I have decided to judge my life as going excellently 
does, in fact, make my life go excellently.52 As far as I know, this issue has not been raised before 
as a problem for either of what were labelled ‘life satisfaction’ or ‘global desire theories’.  
I don’t expect those drawn to subjectivism to give up so easily. I consider two moves such a person 
might make. Before we get to those, I want to note one way of explaining the intuition that, when 
someone judges that their life is going best, this does make it go better, which involves a rejection 
of subjectivism. 
 
51  Ibid, 367 
52 Indeed, this same thinking applies at all levels of well-being; it does not seem my life goes terribly because and to 
the extent that I decide it is going terribly. 
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We might think that, if someone decides their life is going maximally well, this will make them 
happier and, because they are happier, their life is now going better. But if their well-being increases 
only because they are happier, then well-being consists in happiness, not life satisfaction. Hence 
appealing to explanation rejects LSTs in favour of hedonism, so would not be a defence of 
subjectivism at all.53  
The first move for the subjectivist to make is to suppose it cannot be the case that subjectivism 
really allows automaximisation. “Surely”, one might say, “you can’t simply cheat like that. 
Individuals are the authorities on how their lives are going, but there must still be some rules about 
how to assess one’s life.” Indeed, Tiberius supposes that a sophisticated version of the theory will 
have some restrictions and that Sumner’s is such a version.54 
The difficulty for the subjectivist is how to make this move without accidentally abandoning their 
own position. After all, if individuals are the authorities on how their lives are going, how could 
there be any restrictions on how they can assess their lives? I see two ways that the subjectivist can 
defensibly insist on some restrictions. However, neither will blunt the force of the objection.   
It does not seem problematic to insist on formal(/logical) constraints, even if it would be incoherent 
to insist on substantive constraints—rules about which goods, e.g. happiness or success, individuals 
use to determine their overall evaluation of life. For instance, one might insist individuals cannot 
judge their lives as going well because they believe something is both true and not true. It seems 
reasonable to claim that, even if individuals are sovereign over how their lives are going, it does not 
follow they are also sovereign, in some relevant sense, over the rules of logic.  
Equally, it is not obviously incoherent to insist on what Sumner calls the authenticity constraint. 
Sumner argues that, for a subject’s life to go well, not only does that subject need to endorse the 
conditions of her life but: 
it requires that a subject’s endorsement of the conditions of her life, or her experience of 
them as satisfying or fulfilling, be authentic. The conditions for authenticity, in turn, are 
twofold: information and autonomy.55 
For our purposes, we do not need a deep understanding of the information and autonomy 
conditions. The following should suffice. Regarding information, the idea is that if subjects are 
satisfied with their lives, but they would not be if they had some further information, then their 
lives are not, in fact, going well for them after all. Thus, the person who lives “in ignorant bliss 
with a faithless partner” but would be very dissatisfied if they knew of their partner’s philandering, 
is not living a high well-being life.56 
Regarding autonomy, Sumner’s view is that the person’s endorsement of her life must be truly her 
own, in the sense that she formed that endorsement in what he calls the “normal” way, that is, 
without being manipulated. 
 
53  Note that the hedonist would not accept that someone judging their life as going maximally would cause it to go 
maximally well except in the implausible event that doing so in fact makes that person maximally happy.  
54  Tiberius, “Well-Being: Psychological Research for Philosophers.” 
55  Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, 139. 
56  Ibid, 160. 
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We might grant the authenticity constraint is consistent with subjectivism—it is perhaps a procedural 
constraint (how the judgment is made) rather than a substantive constraint (what the judgement 
is), and perhaps it is only the latter that is incompatible with subjectivism.  
However, neither the formal nor procedural constraints block automaximisation. What if I’m the 
sort of person who has authentically decided that I would like to have maximum well-being? If 
subjectivism is true, it seems I just need to pick a reason to conclude that my life is going as well as 
it could. Perhaps I need to be correctly informed about that reason and abide by the rules of logic, 
but that leaves what I can pick wide open. I might decide my life is going maximally well because 
I’ve achieved some laudable, noble, and challenging goal, such as getting a philosophy degree. But 
I could even pick an apparently perverse reason; I might decide I am maximally satisfied with my 
life because two is a prime number or Paris is the capital of France. I do not see how the subjectivist 
can deny this strategy without insisting on the type of substantive constraints that are anathema to 
the view. 
The second move is to claim that, whether or not automaximisation is a problem in theory, it is 
not a problem in practice because individuals will not choose to automaximise. 
This move can be dealt with easily. We are interested in which theory of well-being is theoretically 
adequate. Hence, it is sufficient to raise theoretical problems.57  
In any case, not only should individuals automaximise if they want to have maximum well-being, 
some will. As a case in point, even though I do not find subjectivism plausible, I have decided to 
judge that my life is going maximally well; this seems a sensible precautionary step to take regarding 
one’s well-being, given the trivial costs; I commend it to the reader.58 
Automaximisation raises a serious practical problem—or, perhaps, opportunity—for the 
subjectivist. The standard way empirical life satisfaction researchers proceed is by trying to work 
out what the socio-economic determinants of high life satisfaction are—how income, health, 
relationships, etc. contribute to life satisfaction. The next step is to consider what can be done, 
typically by governments, so that people have more of the things that lead to satisfying lives. But, 
in light of automaximisation, this approach suddenly looks to be the long way around: rather than 
trying to (say) make people richer so that they will be more satisfied, subjectivists should be excited 
about the alternative possibility of simply going around and encouraging people to evaluate their 
lives as going maximally well in their current circumstances.59  
At this point, classically-minded readers might hear echoes of Plato’s Euthyphro dilemma.60 
Roughly, the dilemma is this: are things good because the Gods love them, or do the Gods love 
them because they are good? 
 
57 While this objection might seem facile to philosophers, in conversations with social scientists, I’ve often had it put 
to me that a moral theory only needs to get the ‘right answer’ in practice:  e.g. utilitarianism is true unless and until 
you face a real opportunity to (say) kill one to save five and, as we do not have such opportunities, utilitarianism is 
true. 
58 C.f. ‘Pascal’s Wager’ 
59 Note Amartya Sen's ‘adaptive preferences’ objection to this sort of approach. A Sen, On Ethics and Economics 
(Oxford, 1987).   
60 Harold Fowler, Plato, Euthyphro. Apology. Crito. Phaedo. Phaedrus (Loeb Classical Library, 1914): 10a. 
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If the Gods love things because they are good, then it is not the case that the Gods determine 
what is good; rather goodness is prior to, and separate from, the wills of the Gods. Hence the 
Gods are (disappointingly) non-omnipotent. However, if the goodness of something is caused by 
the act of the Gods loving it, then what constitutes goodness is an entirely arbitrary matter open 
to the capricious whims of the Gods. Intuitively, pain, suffering, murder, and the rest are simply 
bad regardless of what the Gods happening to be thinking at this moment.61 
There is an analogous dilemma for subjectivists: is my life going well because I judge it so, or do I 
judge my life as going well because it is? 
The automaximisation objection derives its force from the intuition that how well my life goes 
cannot merely be a matter of how I judge my life. The alternative path in the dilemma is much 
more plausible: I judge my life as going well because I believe both that certain goods make lives 
go well and that my life has those goods. To take this path rejects subjectivism about theories of 
well-being in favour of objectivism. 
5.2 Too few subjects 
On subjectivism, individuals decide what makes their lives go well. Many sentient entities seem 
incapable of making these sorts of judgements, such as non-human animals or humans with 
cognitive disabilities. Such evaluations require complicated cognitive machinery that these beings 
conspicuously lack; to make an overall evaluation, one must decide which standard(s) you’re going 
to use to evaluate your life and then, taking all the various bits and pieces of your life in aggregate, 
make a judgement. We might, for instance, believe that dogs can feel pleasure and pain, have beliefs 
and desires, likes and dislikes, but nevertheless doubt they are capable of deciding how satisfied 
they are with their lives as a whole. If well-being consists in overall judgments of life, then such 
entities are not welfare subjects; that is, they cannot have well-being at all and there is no sense in 
which we can make things go better or worse for them. 
What follows from this? Suppose you are feeling bored and decide you’re going to set your pet 
dog, Fido, on fire. Fido will, presumably, be in excruciating pain. Subjectivists will hold you have 
not reduced Fido’s well-being, however, because Fido is incapable of having well-being. This is an 
unacceptable implication of the view.  
Intuitively, sentience is the ‘bar’ for being a welfare subject. Subjectivism sets the bar too high, 
requiring not only sentience but also an ability to carry out particular, advanced mental functions. 
Hence, this is the too few subjects objection: subjectivism implies there are far fewer welfare subjects 
than seems believable. 
Interestingly, a problem along these lines has been noted before: Katarina de Lazari-Radek and 
Peter Singer (writing together) and Chris Heathwood point it out for global desire theories, as does 
Sumner for life satisfaction theories. But these authors note it in passing without seeming to 
appreciate its force.62  
 
61 Or, at least, pro tanto bad. 
62  Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer, The Point of View of the Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016): 221; Heathwood, “Desire-Fulfillment Theory,”142; Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, ch. 6. Relatedly 
Roger Crisp, The Cosmos of Duty (Oxford University Press, 2015), 68 when discussing Sidgwick’s notion of pleasure, 
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For instance, de Lazari-Radek and Singer suppose GDT “gives us no way of saying what is good 
for beings who lack the intellectual capacity to envisage their existence over extended periods of 
time.”63 This frames the situation as one where the subjectivist accepts dogs have welfare but that 
we just need them to fill out their theory a bit more and tell us how welfare works for dogs. This 
seems too charitable to the subjectivist. On subjectivism, as individuals determine what makes 
their life go well, it seems nothing makes life go well without that determination, and dogs (and 
others) are not beings capable of making them. Asking how much welfare Fido has is analogous 
to asking how much money Fido has in his bank account—the question is puzzling when Fido 
doesn’t have a bank account and can’t even open one himself; Fido’s welfare is not zero on 
subjectivism, but undefined.  
How can the subjectivist respond? I consider five moves. 
The first is to insist that all sentient creatures can make overall assessments of their lives.  
This is not credible. To make progress, let’s try to be a bit more precise about where the line is. 
Plausibly, self-awareness is a necessary condition for being able to make an overall evaluation of 
one’s life—if a creature lacks a sense of itself, it cannot have a view on how its life is going. As a 
first pass, being able to recognise oneself in a mirror seems a good test of self-awareness. Yet very 
few animals have passed the ‘mirror self-recognition’ test. Those that have passed include great 
apes, dolphins, and elephants.64 Those that have failed include several species of primates, giant 
pandas, and sea lions.65 Hence, assessed this way, subjectivism would deny that even many of the 
most seemingly cognitively advanced sentient creatures are welfare subjects. 
We can press this point with a spectrum argument. Humans, let’s agree, can make overall 
evaluations of their lives. But, if we go back in our evolutionary history, our ancestors were 
primates who presumably lacked self-awareness as assessed by the mirror self-recognition test. 
Suppose, generously, that self-awareness is necessary and sufficient to make life satisfaction 
judgements. What must then be the case is that in our chains of ancestors, there would have to be 
a first individual who had self-awareness—and is therefore a welfare subject—but whose parents 
have only slightly less sophisticated cognitive machinery. The result is that the parents entirely lack 
self-awareness and are, therefore, not welfare subjects. Pressing the implications of this once again, 
what follows from subjectivism is that incinerating the self-aware primate would be bad for it but 
doing the same to its parents could not be bad for them. 
Second, one might propose, to get around this issue, different theories of well-being for different 
types of being, for instance that well-being consists in happiness for those entities who cannot 
 
which has the implication that only ‘intelligent’ entities can experience pleasure, notes this implication is “obviously 
implausible”. 
63  de Lazari-Radek and Singer, The Point of View of the Universe. 
64 See A Pachniewska, “List of Animals That Have Passed the Mirror Test,” AnimalCognition.org, 2015, 
http://www.animalcognition.org/2015/04/15/list-of-animals-that-have-passed-the-mirror-test/. 
65  Xiaozan Ma et al., “Giant Pandas Failed to Show Mirror Self-Recognition,” Animal Cognition 18, no. 3 (May 1, 
2015): 713–21; F. Delfour and K. Marten, “Mirror Image Processing in Three Marine Mammal Species: Killer 
Whales (Orcinus Orca), False Killer Whales (Pseudorca Crassidens) and California Sea Lions (Zalophus 
Californianus),” Behavioural Processes 53, no. 3 (April 26, 2001): 181–90. 
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evaluate their lives, and that welfare consists life satisfaction for those that can. Roughly then, 
“happiness for animals, life satisfaction for humans”.66  
However, this falls victim to exactly the same spectrum argument: humans will have one ape-like 
ancestor whose well-being consists in happiness, but whose child’s well-being consists in life 
satisfaction. This is problematic because a major moral distinction emerges on the basis of 
apparently trivial differences in the non-evaluative facts. 
A further issue is that doing this is motivationally inconsistent for the subjectivist: how can one 
claim that for some entities, subjectivism is true—they are they authorities on what makes their 
lives go well—and for others, subjectivism is false—certain things are intrinsically good/bad 
regardless of their views? This is unsatisfyingly ad hoc. 
A third move is to propose a variant of the view we’ve just discussed. Specifically, the variant is 
that well-being consists in happiness and life satisfaction for entities that can evaluate their lives 
but only happiness for those that can’t; roughly: “happiness for animals, happiness and life 
satisfaction for humans”.  
This does not seem to be an improvement. There is still the awkward spectrum issue: one of our 
ancestors suddenly will have a dual account of well-being their parents lacked. Furthermore, this 
view in fact abandons subjectivism: happiness is deemed good for all entities, regardless of whether 
they think it’s good for them. Finally, we now have a new problem about how to weigh happiness 
and life satisfaction off against each other so as to know how well life is going overall for an entity.  
The fourth move requires some set up. Fred Feldman distinguishes between actualist and 
hypotheticalist life satisfaction theories: on the former, you actually have to assess your life to 
determine how satisfied you are with it, on the latter, your life satisfaction is determined by what 
you would conclude if you thought about.67 I suppose the subjectivist needs to opt for the latter, 
because, on the basis of what we’ve said the former implies beings who do not actually judge their 
lives would lack welfare, which is unacceptable.68 If we move to a hypotheticalist version, we might 
then suppose how well (say) Fido’s life goes depends of how satisfied he would be with his life if 
he were able to judge it.  
The problem with this move is that Fido cannot judge his life as he is. For him to be able to judge 
his life, it would require changing him into a very different sort of being, at which point this 
cognitively enhanced pooch would not be Fido assessing Fido’s life, but some other entity 
evaluating its own life. This is analogous to the scenario where humans ask if, from our own 
perspective, we would like to live as some animal. This is a different question from asking whether 
the animal, from its perspective, enjoys its life.   
In fact, if we accept that entities which cannot actually evaluate their own lives are nevertheless 
welfare subjects on the grounds that there is some appropriately specified alternative version of 
 
66 I am grateful to Casper Kasier and Patrick Kaczmarek for each making this inventive suggestion.  
67  Feldman, “Whole Life Satisfaction Concepts of Happiness.” 
68  Feldman’s objection to the hypotheticalist account of life satisfaction is the case of a ‘happy-go-lucky’ character 
who never stops to reflect on his life and would be dissatisfied if he did so. Feldman supposes this person’s life is 
really going well, which indicates hypotheticalist is false. While hypotheticalism is somewhat counter intuitive, it 
seems far less so than the actualist version on which happy-go-lucky has no welfare. 
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themselves that could, then we would seem to face a new problem, that of having too many 
subjects. After all, Mount Everest cannot evaluate its existence. However, we could imagine some 
version of it that could; hence, Mount Everest would count as a welfare subject too.  
Fifth and finally, subjectivists could bite the bullet and accept many sentient entities are simply not 
capable of having well-being after all. They might point out that hedonists also have to draw the 
line somewhere about which animals can feel pleasure—maybe insects can, maybe they can’t—
and, similarly, working out where the line is on life satisfactionism is an important further empirical 
project.  
For the reasons given above, this response is unsatisfactory—it is hard to believe entities like dogs 
or pandas are incapable of having lives that could go better or worse for them.  
6. Subjectivism’s shoot-out 
We’ve now raised two serious objections to subjectivism. If this were a Western, we’d be at the 
final scene where our protagonist is pinned down in a saloon by its assailants behind an up-turned 
table and counting the rounds left in its revolver. Custom dictates they must now mount a daring 
and sudden attack on their opponents. If the subjectivist can show that the alternative theories of 
well-being face objections that are even worse, we would not need to reject the view. Can the 
subjectivist shoot their way out? 
Let’s first clarify who the subjectivist needs to attack. At the start of this essay we thought we had 
four distinct theories of well-being. It turned out life satisfaction theories of well-being are just a 
type of desire theory. So now we are back to there being three theories of well-being with the 
additional realisation that subjectivism is a variant of one theory. The challenge, then, for the 
subjectivist theory of well-being—the life satisfaction/global desire theory—is to show how each 
of hedonism, non-global desire theories, and the objective list theories are less plausible than it. 
It is outside the aim and scope of this essay to reach an all things considered judgement on which 
theory of well-being is correct. Here, I restrict myself to a few comments on why subjectivists 
might find it harder to attack their rivals than they expected.  
Suppose the subjectivist starts by pointing out that hedonism suffers from a devastating objection, 
the experience machine.69 The experience machine is a virtual reality device built by top scientists 
which we can plug into and will simulate whatever experiences we need to make us maximally 
happy. According to hedonism, plugging into the experience machine would make someone’s life 
go maximally well. Many people think life in the experience machine is not a high well-being life 
and so conclude hedonism must be false. 
Let’s leave aside whether hedonists can defuse the experience machine objection.70 What’s relevant 
here is that the experience machine is best understood not as objection to hedonism only, but to 
any mental state theory of well-being: after all, the experience machine, by stipulation, can generate 
whichever mental states we want it to, including those that would cause someone to judge they are 
maximally satisfied with their life. Hence, if the subjectivist opts for a mental state version of their 
theory, they are pushed to plug into the experience machine too. This result might be a surprise: 
 
69 R Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974). 
70 See e.g. Crisp, “Hedonism Reconsidered” for such an attempt. 
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in conversation, I’ve often had it put to me by advocates of LSTs that a reason to hold the view is 
that it, unlike hedonism, avoids the experience machine objection.  
Thus, if the subjectivist wants to attack hedonism while accepting a mental state account, they 
need to do so on the grounds that the particular objectivist good which hedonists contend makes 
life go well, namely happiness, does not, on reflection, make life go well. This seems hard to pull 
off: happiness has the most obvious claim to being what makes life go well. 
Of course, the subjectivist can say that happiness still matters for our well-being because and to 
the extent that our happiness affects our overall satisfaction with life. But seems to be the wrong 
sort of explanation: it is odd to claim pain and suffering are instrumentally bad for us, bad for us 
only because they make us evaluate our lives less positively. Intuitively, they are simply bad—
intrinsically bad—and not bad for some further reason. 
The tempting move for the subjectivist, and the one Sumner takes, is to go for a non-mental state 
version of the theory. Sumner achieves this via the previously discussed information condition of 
the authenticity constraint, on which subjects do not just have to be satisfied with the conditions 
of their lives, they need the information they used to make such judgements to be correct.71 Hence, 
Sumner can contend the experience machine will not cause maximal well-being because individuals 
inside the machine only think their lives are going well on the basis of false information.  
In its rivalry with hedonism, this move would seem to help the global desire theory somewhat. 
However, it is not a totally costless move, as non-mental state theories face objections of their 
own, such as Parfit’s Stranger on a Train case:72 
You meet a stranger on a train who tells you he is battling cancer and is on the way to 
receive treatment. You form a desire for him to survive and decide you will be more 
satisfied with your life as a whole if he does. You never see him again and he later dies of 
cancer. 
On a non-mental state global desire theory your life goes worse because he dies, even though you 
never find out about it. Many find this result implausible specifically because it’s puzzling to think 
that something can make your life go better or worse if it has no impact on your mental states. All 
this said, if one is going to be a subjectivist, it seems the more plausible version of the view is a 
non-mental state one.  
Now we can ask how plausible the (non-mental state) global desire theory is compared to 
alternative (non-mental state) desire theories. In fact, we’ve already discussed this. A reason we 
were drawn towards a global desire theory and away from a summative desire theory was to avoid 
the counterintuitive result that your life goes better in Parfit’s Addiction case. However, we now 
recognise that while the global desire theory dodges Addiction, it faces objections which seem much 
worse—namely automaximisation and too few subjects. Summative desire theories don’t suffer 
from these objections due to their inclusion of local desires: your local desire, e.g. to go on holiday 
to Tahiti, isn’t met simply by you deciding you’ve met it, and animals will have local desires. Hence, 
 
71  Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics: 139 
72  Parfit, Reasons and Persons: 494 
20 
 
if one is going to be a desire theorist, it’s not at all clear one should opt for the global version over 
the summative version after all.  
How does subjectivism stack up against the objective list, a view we’ve said almost nothing about? 
Two points of clarification. First, as others have noted, ‘list’ is an unhelpful descriptor if it’s 
supposed to differentiate the objective list from the other two main theories of well-being: all 
theories of well-being are a list of what constitutes well-being; some, e.g. hedonism, are merely 
single-item lists.73 Second, it is unclear what ‘objective’ means. This could be in contrast to mental 
state theories, subjectivist theories, or to pro-attitudist theories. Seeing as we’re interested in rivals 
to subjectivism, and we’ve already discussed the two main (only?) pro-attitude theories—hedonism 
and desire satisfaction—we are specifically concerned with those theories where well-being does 
not consist solely in happiness or satisfied desires. Candidates for this list, which could be a single 
or a multi-item list, might include friendship, knowledge, love, and autonomy. 
Because there are any number of candidates, and combinations of candidates, for this list, this 
might seem to make the task of the subjectivist insurmountable. I will just make two further general 
comments.  
First, if the list is multi-item, one avenue the subjectivist could always pursue is to push for 
explanations both of why those, and only those items, made the list and how those different goods 
can be made traded-off against each to determine levels of well-being.  
Second, despite the criticisms raised against subjectivism here, it is clearly more plausible than some 
possible objectivist theories. To push the point, subjectivism has far more appeal than, to use a 
deliberately silly example, hattism, the view that well-being consists in the number of hats someone 
owns. Hence, the subjectivist only needs to take on the credible alternative objectivist goods we’ve 
not discussed here, such as, (say) knowledge. Discussing how subjectivism compares in a head-to-
head against the more plausible objectivist good is outside the scope of this essay; I leave such 
matters to the interested reader to pursue.  
7. Conclusion 
In philosophy, life satisfaction theories of well-being have been treated as an alternative to the 
three canonical theories of well-being, although as an alternative whose distinctness was not clear. 
I argued that life satisfaction theories were a type of desire theory—the global desire theory—in 
disguise. I then argued against the plausibility of the life/global desire satisfaction theory on 
grounds of its subjectivism, which I showed suffers two acute problems that have been either 
unrecognised or underappreciated. While I did not argue for an alternative, objectivist theory of 
well-being, I indicated why and how subjectivists will struggle to take on their rivals, even if they 
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